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ABSTRACT
Controversy surrounding drug pricing is ever-present. However,
the focus on pricing practices has shifted with the influx of orphan drug
designations. Many big players in the pharmaceutical and biotech
industries have harvested enormous profits by finding unique ways to
manipulate the Orphan Drug Act’s incentive program. Meanwhile,
scientific research startups have viewed the Act as a gateway to break
into the pharmaceutical sector. As a result of the industry’s growing
interest in the orphan drug market, patients suffering from rare diseases
enjoy tremendous benefits from medicinal innovation that would have
otherwise gone undiscovered. In addition, the Act’s financial
incentives make market entry more feasible for young pharmaceutical
and biotech companies, thereby expanding industry competition. So,
why have politicians begun to attack the orphan drug market? Through
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the current Administration has slashed tax
incentives for orphan drug manufacturers in half. In addition, the FDA
issued a Guidance that recommends eliminating research exemptions
previously available to pediatric subpopulations under the Pediatric
Research Equity Act. These joint measures attempt to address
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profitable exploitation of the Orphan Drug Act. However, they
continue to ignore patient price concerns as well as the undeniable
innovative benefits that flow from the Orphan Drug Act. Reducing tax
credits and forcing drug makers to engage in more extensive pediatric
research for rare diseases may reduce big pharma’s profits. However,
it will not save patients money or make more treatments available to
them. Instead, pharmaceutical and biotech firms are incentivized to
continue operating free from transparency while price-gouging orphan
drug consumers, or to reduce their engagement in the pediatric orphan
drug market and seek more profitable ventures. In the end, the only
groups that stand to lose are children suffering from rare diseases.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Organization for Rare Diseases (“NORD”) kickstarted 2018 with a commemoration, celebrating the 35th anniversary
of the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”), a law that provides incentives for the
development of treatments for rare diseases. 1 However, NORD may
have less to celebrate and more to advocate for in coming years due to
reduced financial incentives under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“Tax
Bill”), as well as stricter research guidelines proposed in the Food and
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) guidance entitled “Clarification of
Orphan Designations of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric
Subpopulations of Common Diseases” (“Guidance”). The same is true
for Tasha Nelson, Courtney Waller, and Rebecca Mauldin, all mothers
of children afflicted with rare diseases.
Ms. Nelson, whose son Jack was only one-month old when he was
diagnosed with cystic fibrosis, explains, “[a]ny dime you take from a
company that is working toward saving my son’s life is an insult to my

1. National Organization for Rare Diseases, NORD and the Orphan Drug Act
Celebrate 35th Anniversaries, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.pr
newswire.com/news-releases/nord-and-the-orphan-drug-act-celebrate-35th-annivers
aries-300577648.html [hereinafter NORD].
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family.” 2 Yet, that is precisely what the Tax Bill has done by slashing
tax credits for the research and development (“R&D”) of orphan drugs
in half. 3 Nelson fears that drug companies “may not have the
resources” to help Jack fight cystic fibrosis if tax breaks are reduced or
eliminated. 4 While there may be some debate about the pharmaceutical
industry’s access to abundant financial resources, Nelson’s belief that
the industry will reduce its participation in the orphan drug market is
merited. Indeed, a June 2015 analysis prepared for NORD and the
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”) found that without the
orphan drug tax credit, approximately 33% fewer orphan therapies will
be developed and approved over the next ten years. 5
Another argument in opposition of reduced tax incentives for
orphan drug manufacturers stems from pricing concerns. Orphan drugs
are notorious for their hefty price tags. However, some drug
manufacturers have alleviated the burden on consumers by offering
company-sponsored copays, which can significantly reduce out-ofpocket expenses for patients. 6 For example, through a drug company’s
copay program, Jack’s mother pays a mere $25 per month for his cystic
fibrosis treatment, Pulmozyme — a deep discount compared to its
market price of $6,000 per month. 7 If the tax credit has a significant
enough impact on manufacturers’ profit margin, some fear consumer
pricing for orphan drugs will increase or company-sponsored discount
programs will be eliminated.
Although families of children afflicted with rare diseases
vehemently oppose orphan tax credit reductions, curiously,
pharmaceutical companies are not fighting back against these
2. Meghan Holohan, Unlikely Lobbyists: Parents of Kids with Rare Diseases
Fight Against Tax Bill, TODAY (Nov. 13, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.today.com
/parents/parents-kids-rare-diseases-rally-against-tax-bill-t118672.
3. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131
Stat. 2054 (2017) (reducing the orphan drug tax credit from 25% to 50%).
4. Holohan, supra note 2.
5. BIOTECH. INDUSTRY ORG. & NAT. ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, IMPACT OF
THE ORPHAN DRUG TAX CREDIT ON TREATMENTS FOR RARE DISEASES (June 2015),
https://rarediseases.org/assets/files/white-papers/2015-06-17.nord-bio-ey-odtc.pdf.
6. Holohan, supra note 2.
7. Id. (explaining, additionally, that under a similar program, Ms. Mauldin,
whose son Jonathan has spent most of his life battling a rare cancer called Langerhans
cell histiocytosis, pays only $10 of the $1,500 monthly cost of his treatment).
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diminished incentives. This is largely attributed to the Tax Bill’s
accompanying provisions, which provide the companies with an even
greater benefits through reduced corporate tax rates and special
repatriation rates. 8
Pharmaceutical companies are, however, voicing concerns over the
FDA’s Guidance that seeks to eliminate Pediatric Research Equity Act
(“PREA”) exemptions previously available to some orphan
subpopulations. For over fifteen years, drugs with a pediatricsubpopulation orphan designation were exempt from PREA. Meaning,
manufacturers were not required to conduct additional safety and
efficacy trials on children when applying for FDA approval on an adult
indication. At least one drug maker fears that a departure from this
exemption “is likely to impede and delay development of important
new medicines for children because without an orphan drug
designation, developing novel drugs and biologics for children is more
difficult and[,] in many cases, practically impossible.” 9
This article draws attention to the anticipated adverse implications
of depleting financial incentives for orphan drug manufacturers and
imposing stricter research guidelines for rare pediatric diseases. Part I
provides an overview of the ODA, as well as pediatric drug legislation
including the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”) and
PREA. Part II focuses on the loopholes imbedded in these statutes and
the opportunistic efforts drug manufactures have used to exploit them.
Part III discusses the current administration’s two-fold effort to address
these abuses using the Tax Bill and FDA’s Guidance. Part IV observes
that these administrative efforts could have an adverse impact on the
pricing and availability of orphan drugs for pediatric subpopulations
and analyzes the evidence supporting and opposing these predictions.
8. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLARIFICATION OF ORPHAN DESIGNATION
OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS FOR PEDIATRIC SUBPOPULATIONS OF COMMON DISEASES:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (July 27, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
9. Letter from Carry A. Neil, M.D., Chief Scientific Officer, Aevi Genomic
Medicine, to Docket Management Branch, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re: Docket
No. FDA-2017-D-6380, Clarification of Orphan Drug Designation of Drugs and
Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Draft Guidance for
Industry (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D6380-0015 [hereinafter Aevi Letter]; see also Developers Voice Concerns Over Draft
Guidance Closing Orphan Drug Loophole, FDA NEWS: DRUG DAILY BULLETIN (Feb.
27, 2018), https://www.fdanews.com/articles/185776-developers-voice-concern-over
-draft-guidance-closing-orphan-drug-loophole.
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The article concludes by suggesting that the Tax Bill and Guidance may
have an unsubstantial effect on pricing patterns in the orphan drug
market. However, these joint administrative efforts are likely to cause
reduced engagement in the pediatric orphan drug market, thereby
diminishing access to and availability of treatments for children
suffering from rare diseases.
I. ORPHANS AND TWINS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ODA AND
CONTIGUOUS PEDIATRIC DRUG LEGISLATION
While the Tax Bill and Guidance are independent administrative
efforts, their joint impact threatens to have an adverse effect on the cost
and accessibility of orphan treatments for ill children. The Tax Bill
slashes tax incentives for all orphan drugs, while the PREA Guidance
makes it more difficult for drug manufacturers to receive orphan
designations for pediatric treatments. To properly analyze the potential
effects of the Tax Bill and PREA Guidance, it is necessary to
understand the history of the ODA, and the legislation specific to
pediatric patient populations including PREA and its predecessor,
BPCA.
A. History of the Orphan Drug Act
Pharmaceutical research in the United States relies on a
combination of government funding and private investment. 10 “The
revenue potential of a drug in treating a particular disease can influence
for-profit manufacturers’ willingness to devote necessary resources to
its development.” 11 Rare diseases, also commonly referred to as
“orphan diseases,” are defined as those which affect 200,000 or fewer
patients within the United States. 12 Traditionally, diseases that affect
10. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983-2009:
Regulatory and Clinical Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, in RARE &
ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, a report by
INST. OF MED. U.S. COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASE RESEARCH & ORPHAN
PROD. DEV., (Field MJ & Boat TF eds., 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK56187.
11. Id.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1997) (“[T]he term ‘rare disease or condition’
means any disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the
United States, or (B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which
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such a limited population do not permit recovery of private research
investment. 13 “As their name implies, ‘orphan’ drugs were drugs that
nobody wanted to produce . . . because too few people had the different
diseases.” 14 Consequently, pharmaceutical companies believed that
R&D expenditures on such drugs could not be recouped. 15 Without
adequate incentives available to entice participation in the orphan drug
market, therapeutic products for orphan conditions developed slowly if
at all. 16 To address these concerns and stimulate private-industry R&D
for treatments with modest project potential, a three-fold effort was set
in place between 1982 and 1983. 17 First, the FDA created the Office of
Orphan Products Development, which is “dedicated to promoting the
development of products that demonstrate promise for the diagnosis
and/or treatment of rare diseases.” 18 Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed the ODA and, on January 4, 1983, President Reagan signed it
into law. 19 Finally, “the coalition of patient advocates formally
established NORD as a nonprofit organization to provide advocacy,
education, research and patient/family services for all Americans
affected by rare diseases.” 20 Central to these efforts was the ODA,21
which was aimed at solving an important problem – “how to induce a

there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in
the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in
the United States of such drug.”).
13. Kesselheim, supra note 10.
14. RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 206
(2007).
15. Id.
16. Kesselheim, supra note 10.
17. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 39
(2d ed. 2007).
18. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 147 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
19. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) [hereinafter
ODA]; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ff (2017) (addressing drugs for rare diseases or
conditions under the Orphan Drug Act).
20. NORD, supra note 1.
21. ODA, supra note 19.
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market-driven pharmaceutical industry to develop new therapeutics for
diseases affecting relatively small numbers of persons.” 22
The ODA has succeeded in many of its goals. 23 It increased the
availability and approval of drugs to treat low-prevalence conditions,24
decreased mortality rates for persons with orphan conditions, 25 and
made market participation more feasible for startup bio-pharma
manufacturers. 26 The ODA has also been instrumental in the
development of treatments for pediatric subpopulations. 27
1. The ODA’s Impact on Pediatric Drug Development
In a study published by the American Academy of Pediatrics in
2012, researchers provided a ten-year analysis focused on the ODA’s
progress in stimulating pediatric drug production. 28 The study reports
“increasing pediatric orphan product designations and approvals from
2000 to 2009,” indicating that “the [ODA] has continued to address this
important unmet need.” 29 Specifically, the study reports that, from
2000 to 2009, 26% of all orphan drugs that received marketing approval
were for pediatric diseases. 30 Further, “[t]he proportion of approvals
for pediatric products increased from 17.5% . . . in the first half of the
22. Robert A. Bohrer, It’s the Antigen Stupid: A Risk/Reward Approach to the
Problem of Orphan Drug Act Exclusivity for Monoclonal Antibody Therapeutics, 5
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
23. Id. at 2 (“Although some drugs for small patient populations have been
exceedingly profitable, the need for special incentives to spur pharmaceutical
manufacturers to undertake the costly and risky process of drug development and
research for less common diseases was clear to the Congressional sponsors of the Act
and the Act has been largely judged a success.”).
24. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 121.
25. Id.
26. Aevi Letter, supra note 9 (noting that incentives under the ODA are
extremely important to small pharmaceutical companies).
27. See generally Chandana Thorat, et al., What the Orphan Drug Act Has Done
Lately for Children with Rare Diseases: A 10-Year Analysis, 29 PEDIATRICS 516
(2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(9)(iv) (2015) (defining pediatric populations
as including patients aged “birth to 16 years, including age groups often called
neonates, infants, children, and adolescents”).
28. Thorat, supra note 27, at 516–21.
29. Id. at 516.
30. Id.
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decade, to 30.8% . . . in the second.” 31 Although there have been very
few systematic studies quantifying the ODA’s contribution to drug
development for children with rare diseases, these calculations provide
a promising outlook on the improvement of drug availability for
pediatric subpopulations. 32
2. The ODA’s Incentive Structure
The ODA’s success in expanding the availability of drugs for
ailments afflicting small patient populations is derived from the four
extremely generous financial incentives it offers orphan drug
manufactures. 33 First, no patent is necessary to gain market
exclusivity. 34
Once the FDA’s Office of Orphan Products
Development grants orphan drug status to a new product, the drug
company receives exclusive marketing rights for seven years. 35 This
means that the FDA will not grant approval to any other drug for the
same indication within that seven-year period. 36 Second, the FDA
provides grant money to companies in order to defray the costs of
testing the drugs. 37 Third, the FDA provides assistance in “protocol
design and new drug applications (NDA) or product license approval
(PLA) applications.” 38 Finally, the ODA offers a tax credit for clinical
R&D expenditures, which has raised great concern after being
significantly reduced from 50% to 25% by the newly enacted Tax
Bill. 39
31. Id.
32. Id. at 517 (reporting that “there have been no systematic analysis”
quantifying the ODA’s contribution to pediatric drug development) (emphasis added).
33. VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207.
34. See id.
35. 21 U.S.C. §360cc(a) (2017); see also VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2017) (“[T]he Secretary may not approve another
application . . . for the same drug for the same disease or condition for a person who
is not the holder of such approved application or of such license until the expiration
of seven years form the date of the approval of the approved application or the
issuance of the license.”).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2017); see also VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207.
38. SCHWEITZER, supra note 17, at 39; 21 U.S.C § 360aa (2017); see also Bohrer,
supra note 22, at 18 n.32.
39. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131
Stat. 2054 (2017).
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B. BPCA and PREA: The Contiguous Pediatric Drug Statutes
Another area of contention arises where the ODA and pediatric
drug legislation intersect. Through the ODA, Congress effectively
addressed the once disparate availability of treatments for patients with
rare diseases. 40 However, many years passed before Congress
recognized the inadequate availability of safe and effective drugs for
another underserved population – children. 41 “[I]n 2001, only twenty
percent of prescription medications were tested and approved for use in
children.” 42 Children nonetheless required treatment, and physicians
engaged in “off-label” 43 prescription practices whereby children
received drugs approved exclusively for adults. 44 It became common
practice to dose children with adjusted quantities of the medication
calculated solely according to their lower body weight. 45 However, this
dosing standard was highly inaccurate and problematic because it did
not take into account the metabolic differences between a child and an
adult. 46 Additionally, “the lack of age-appropriate formulations, such
40. Bohrer, supra note 22, at 2 (noting the ODA is judged as a success).
41. The ODA was passed in 1983. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96
Stat. 2049 (1983). Meanwhile, the first legislative effort that specifically addressed
the need for adequate clinical studies in children came in 1997 with the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDMA), which was subsequently
reenacted through the BPCA in 2002. See Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997); see also Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
42. Lisa Jerles, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the
Pediatric Research Equity Act – Helping or Hurting America’s Children, 6 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 515, 516 (2008) (citation omitted).
43. Off-label use refers to the use of an “FDA-approved medical product for a
use that has not been studied yet” and is also referred to as “unapproved use of an
approved product.” U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GLOSSARY OF TERMS,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/ClinicalTrials/ucm410359.htm#O-1 (last visited
May 1, 2019).
44. See Joanna K. Sax, Reforming FDA Policy for Pediatric Testing: Challenges
and Changes in the Wake of Studies Using Antidepressant Drugs, 4 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 61, 65 (2007) (“[B]ecause relatively few drugs are tested on pediatric
populations, doctors tend to ‘dose down’ adult dosages to account for the lower body
weight in children.”).
45. Jerles, supra note 42, at 516; see also Sax, supra note 44, at 62.
46. Sax, supra note 44, at 76 (“The protocol of ‘down dosing’ adult
prescriptions to account for the smaller size of children does not address physiological
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as liquid forms for children who cannot yet swallow drugs in pill form,
[made] it difficult to administer medication to children.” 47
To curb these problems, Congress created several programs to
promote pediatric studies and changed the regulatory landscape. 48
Today, the most important of these legislative efforts are the BPCA49
and PREA 50, enacted in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Although both
Acts are intended to promote pediatric studies, each operates
differently. The BPCA operates as a “carrot,” incentivizing drug
manufacturers with an additional six months of market exclusivity
when it submits reports of pediatric studies that fairly respond to a
written request from the FDA and are conducted in accordance with
generally applicable scientific principles and protocols. 51 Meanwhile,
PREA operates as the “stick,” requiring drug makers to conduct studies
that reflect “an assessment of safety and effectiveness (including dosing
information) for the proposed indication in all relevant pediatric
subpopulations.” 52
The combined impact of BPCA and PREA has been highly
successful in providing parents and providers with essential information
on the safety and efficacy of drugs used to treat children. 53 In fact, the
American Academy of Pediatrics asserts that “[c]hildren are safer
differences between adults and children.”); Jerles, supra note 42, at 517 n.9 (“The
drug Cyclosporine was approved for adults to counter organ rejection following
transplants. The drug was then used in children without testing and without the same
success. Researchers eventually discovered that children metabolize Cyclosporine
much faster than adults, therefore needing more frequent dosing.”) (citations omitted).
47. Jerles, supra note 42, at 517 (citation omitted).
48. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 3.
49. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408
(2002).
50. Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2017).
52. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 2–3 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-155 (2003), codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (2017)).
53. Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics, et al., to Scott Gottlieb,
Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., RE: Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380,
Clarification of Orphan Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric
Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Draft Guidance of Industry; Availability, 1
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0010
[hereinafter AAP Letter] (“[M]ore than 640 drugs and biologics [have been] relabeled
with important information about their use in children”).
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because of what we have learned through BPCA and PREA studies, and
the pediatricians who care for them are better equipped to make clinical
decisions for their patients.” 54 However, PREA contains a “loophole,”
which permits orphan drug manufacturers to seek exemptions from
some of their obligations to conduct pediatric studies. 55 The American
Academy of Pediatrics and its partners explain:
Currently, a drug for a common disease, that would otherwise not be
eligible for orphan status, can receive orphan status for just the
pediatric population with that disease, if such population is under
200,000. After receiving that designation, the sponsor can decide not
to pursue pediatric drug studies at all, despite requesting the pediatric
designation. 56

Recognition of this loophole has given rise to increased scrutiny of the
pharmaceutical industry’s opportunistic exploitation of ODA
incentives. 57
II. FILLING THE PIGGYBANK: AN EXPLANATION OF ODA MISUSES,
THE PREA LOOPHOLE, AND THE INTERPLAY OF PHARMA-ECONOMICS
Because “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is a competitive and
potentially very lucrative marketplace,” the high-stakes business
challenges it faces can harness significant risks as well as substantial
rewards. 58 Despite projections from EvaluatePharma’s World Preview
estimating that worldwide pharmaceutical drug sales will reach more
than $1 trillion by 2022, this forecast actually reflects a decrease for the
same period last year. 59 This is the first time in ten years that drug sales
54. Id.
55. Id.; see infra Part I, sec. B (explaining the operative details of the PREA
“loophole”).
56. AAP Letter, supra note 53, at 1; see also infra Part I, sec. B.
57. AAP Letter, supra note 53, at 1 (“This loophole allows sponsors to exploit
the process and this must change.”).
58. Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons
From Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 640 (2010).
59. Biotech Industry Moves Towards a Patent Cliff, THE BIO REPORT, at 0:58
(July 13, 2017) (download through iTunes podcast query) [hereinafter THE BIO
REPORT] (interviewing Antonio Iervolino, head of forecasting for EvaluatePharma).
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have been projected to fall instead of rise, a phenomenon that
forecasters attribute to pricing pressures as well as the advent of more
biosimilar products. 60 While price-gouging and concerns about
consumer affordability in the capitalistic pharmaceutical market are
nothing new to the political pulpit, “pushback from consumers,
[pharmacy benefit managers], payers and lawmakers has become much
stronger as of late.” 61
In the drug development market, “[p]rofits are measured in billions
of dollars in annual sales and unexpected, sudden market collapses are
not uncommon.” 62 This juxtaposition incentivizes big-players in the
pharmaceutical and biotech industries to engage in unconventional and
creative strategies. Specifically, drug makers caught the attention of
political forces due to their exploitation of the orphan drug system, as
well as their use of the PREA “loophole” to avoid mandatory R&D
testing in children.
A. Exploiting Orphans: How Big Pharma Misuses the ODA to
Render Big Profits
The exploitation of ODA incentives did not begin with the pediatric
market and certainly does not end there either. These efforts are far
more expansive. For example, although ODA policies were intended
to incentivize drug companies to participate in markets for
underrepresented and otherwise less profitable diseases, ironically,
“[s]even of the [ten] best-selling drugs in the country in 2015 were
orphan drugs.” 63 Critics claim that these high yield returns on orphan
drugs are a result of drug manufacturers gaming the system by seeking
an orphan designation for drugs that were “first approved for the mass

60. Id. at 3:18; see also EVALUATEPHARMA, WORLD PREVIEW 2017, OUTLOOK
2022 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (10th ed. June 2017), http://info.evaluategroup.
com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/WP2017-SUM.pdf.
61. Jacob Bell, Pricing Pressures Lower Drug Sales Forecasts, New Report
Finds, BIOPHARMADIVE.COM (June 21, 2017), https://www.bropharmadive.com/
news/evaluatepharma-pricing-report-world-preview/445516.
62. Seaman, supra note 58, at 640.
63. Sarah Janes Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs for Rare Diseases Have
Become Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, NPR: HEALTH INC. (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:59 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-dise
ases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies.
TO
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market and later won approval for a rare disease.” 64 Conversely, some
drugs have been introduced with an orphan status to gain financial
subsidies and market exclusivity, then are continuously reintroduced to
treat other ailments, thereby making the “leap from orphan to rolling
blockbuster.” 65
Critics say these drugs are not “true” orphans but are being misused
to give manufacturers a market monopoly. 66 Botox, Allergan’s bestselling product, provides an illustration of this practice. Botox received
orphan approval in 1984 to treat painful muscle spasms of the eye,
uncontrolled blinking, and neck pain. 67 Since then, the FDA has
approved Botox for two additional orphan designations and as a “mass
market drug to treat a variety of ailments, including chronic migraines
and wrinkles.” 68 “Today, there are 5 million doses of Botox
administered annually in North America, which translates into
approximately $1.5 billion in sales.” 69
Another “concern that has long plagued the ODA is the potential
for drug developers to . . . artificially subdivide diseases to create
subgroups of patients that fall under the orphan drug prevalence
threshold – a practice referred to as ‘salami slicing.’” 70 For example,
Epogen received an orphan designation in 1986 and final FDA approval
in 1989 to treat anemia caused by end-stage renal failure. 71 Shortly
thereafter, Epogen became widely prescribed for a broad range of
patients with anemia unrelated to end-stage renal failure. 72
“Consequently, through off-label use . . . in patients without end-stage
64. Id.
65. Michael N. Abrams & Rita E. Numerof, The Growing Orphan-Drug
Paradigm, 25 BIOPHARM INTERNATIONAL.COM (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.biopharm
international.com/growing-orphan-drug-paradigm-0.
66. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.
67. Abrams & Numerof, supra note 65.
68. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.
69. Abrams & Numerof, supra note 65.
70. Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug Incentives in the
Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the US and Canada, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 263, 268 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsv013 (citing David
Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A
Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 365 (2005)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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renal disease, Epogen became a blockbuster drug and generated billions
of dollars in revenue for its manufacturer.” 73 Similarly, Genentech
developed human growth hormone (hGH) to treat children with
hypopituitary dwarfism, then later received mass profits for the drug’s
use to treat other growth deficiencies. 74
Due to the high profitability, more compelling market value
propositions, and a faster route to market, “[t]he orphan drug market is
expected to almost double during the 2016-22 period, peaking at
$209bn in 2022.” 75 “No one disputes that orphan drugs have helped or
saved hundreds of thousands of patients suffering from debilitating or
even fatal rare diseases.” 76 Yet, as former Representative Henry
Waxman points out, drug manufacturers have turned the ODA on its
head by using it as the “basis of manipulating the system . . . to make
much more money than they would in an open competitive market.” 77
B. Neglecting the Children: How the PREA Loophole Exempts Drug
Makers from R&D Requirements in Pediatric Subpopulations
Beyond creative abuses of the ODA, politicians have identified a
secondary problem that lies at the intersection of PREA and the ODA.
“Section 505B(k) of the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act contains a
statutory exemption from the requirement to conduct pediatric studies
under PREA for certain drugs with orphan designations.” 78 The FDA
explains, this unintended “loophole” allows sponsors to “submit a
marketing application for use of its drug in the non-orphan adult
population,” then use the ODA to get a pediatric-subpopulation

73. Id.
74. Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two Proteins: The FDA’s
Uncertain Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 365, 381
(1999) (quoting JOHN HENKEL, ORPHAN DRUG PRODUCTS: NEW HOPE FOR PEOPLE
WITH RARE DISORDERS, FDA SPECIAL REPORT ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1995)).
75. EVALUATEPHARMA, supra note 60, at 3.
76. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.
77. Id.
78. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355c(k) (2017)).
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designation for the juvenile subset of the disease. 79 By way of example,
for “a condition like inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), a drug may be
approved to treat the large population of adults with the condition but
then the same drug may be granted an orphan designation to treat a
subset of children suffering from IBD.” 80 Due to this designation, the
drug’s sponsor is “exempt from conducting the pediatric studies
normally required under PREA when seeking approval of the adult
indication.” 81
This means, when a sponsor seeks FDA approval for a drug
intended to treat a common adult illness, it can use an orphan
designation get around PREA testing requirements if that illness occurs
rarely in children. FDA Commissioner Dr. Scott Gottlieb explains,
“once a drug receives an orphan designation for a pediatric population
of the adult disease, the drug then becomes statutorily exempt from the
requirements of PREA.” 82
For example, if FDA grants pediatric-subpopulations designation for
a sponsor’s drug for pediatric ulcerative colitis and the sponsor
submits an NDA . . . for its drug to treat ulcerative colitis in adults,
the sponsor would be exempt from having to conduct pediatric
studies under PREA by virtue of having the pediatric-subpopulation
designation for pediatric ulcerative colitis. This is despite the fact
that prevalence of the ulcerative colitis indication as a whole is
greater than 200,000 and despite the fact that pediatric ulcerative
colitis does not meet the definition of an orphan subset under 21
C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13). 83

79. Announcement of the Availability of Clarification of Orphan Designation
of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Guidance
for Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 35655 (July 27, 2018).
80. Zachary Brennan, FDA to Close Loophole Allowing Companies to Skirt
Pediatric Study Requirements, RAPS: REGULATORY FOCUS (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%e2%84%a2/news-articles/2017/9/fda-toclose-loophole-allowing-companies-to-skirt-pediatric-study-requirements.
81. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4.
82. Scott Gottlieb, M.D., FDA is Advancing the Goals of the Orphan Drug Act,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: FDA VOICES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612012.htm; see also Brennan, supra note
80.
83. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4; 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13).
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Gottlieb contends that this creates a “loophole” which directly opposes
congressional intent. 84
He asserts, “[n]obody envisioned this
unintended conflict between the original ODA and the provisions
outlined in PREA,” which effectively provides drug makers with a “free
pass from having to study drugs in pediatric uses.” 85 Gottlieb
continues, “rather than ensuring more pediatric research, as Congress
envisioned, we can end up with fewer pediatric studies.” 86
Although this “loophole” has existed for the entire fifteen years
since PREA’s enactment, it has only recently fostered negative
attention. This leaves some with the impression that Gottlieb is
sensationalizing the problem. For example, NORD contends that the
FDA has “not provide[d] sufficient evidence of the perceived
loophole;” accordingly, the organization has asked the FDA for further
evidence that this loophole is being exploited, including information
about how many therapies were exempted from PREA, while also
receiving a pediatric subpopulation orphan designation, and not being
subject to additional pediatric testing. 87 In addition, the Guidance itself
makes clear that, although drugs with ODA designations are exempt
from PREA, they nonetheless can be the subject of a written request for
pediatric testing under BPCA. 88 This mechanism seems to undermine
Gottlieb’s argument that drug makers are receiving a “free pass” from
studying drugs in pediatric uses. 89 Nevertheless, the FDA continues to
scrutinize the pharmaceutical industry’s use of the PREA “loophole” as

84. Gottlieb, supra note 82.
85. Id.; see also Brennan, supra note 80.
86. Gottlieb, supra note 82.
87. NHGRI Launches Strategic Planning Process for Genomic Research and
Funding, CENTERWATCH (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.centerwatch.com/cwweekly
/2018/02/26/nhgri-launches-strategic-planning-process-genomic-research-funding.
88. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that BPCA provides “an additional
six months of market exclusivity when a sponsor submits reports of pediatric studies
that fairly respond to a written request from FDA and are conducted in accordance
with generally applicable scientific principles and protocols”); see also SAFE &
EFFECTIVE MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN: PEDIATRIC STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE
BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT & THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY
ACT (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat, eds., National Academies Press 2012),
https://www.nap.edu/read/13311/chapter/3#34 (“Drugs with designations under the
Orphan Drug Act are exempt under PREA but can be the subject of written requests”).
89. See Gottlieb, supra note 82 (emphasis added).
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a measure to avoid the added time and monetary investments for R&D
in limited pediatric subpopulations.
Yet, as discussed in Part I, these strategic measures do not always
result in detrimental effects on patients. One benefit is shown through
the influx of treatments for pediatric populations regardless of the
shortcomings that flow from the “loophole.” Another benefit flows
from the orphan drug system, which has undoubtedly incentivized the
development of treatments for rare aliments that may have otherwise
gone unattended. This is true despite concerns about excess
profitability and repurposing. 90
Notwithstanding these positive
advancements, the high price of brand-name prescription drugs in the
mass market, as well as the orphan drug market, remains an everpresent and significant concern that cannot be ignored. In fact,
“[s]crutiny of drug prices around the globe is expected to exert growing
pressure on the biopharmaceutical sector” in the coming years. 91
Unfortunately, several challenges stand in the way of
accomplishing reasonable pricing models in the pharmaceutical sector.
Brett Saunders, Chief Executive Officer of Allergan, points out that one
of the problems lies with opposition from some drug companies who
resist voluntary price capping 92 and continue to increase list prices to
exorbitant levels.
However, the greater challenge lies with
incompatible regulatory structures that fail to balance the economic
interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers with important patient
protections.
III. TAKING CANDY FROM A BABY AND IMPOSING STRICTER RULES:
HOW THE TAX BILL CUT INCENTIVES FOR ORPHAN DRUG SPONSORS,
AND THE GUIDANCE EXPANDED PEDIATRIC R&D REQUIREMENTS
UNDER PREA
The current administration has taken a two-fold approach to
addressing some of the problems that plague the industry’s pediatric
orphan drug sector. The first approach uses the Tax Bill to reduce the
90. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.
91. THE BIO REPORT, supra note 59, at 0:53.
92. See Jared S. Hopkins, Allergan CEO Pushes for Trump to Lead Drug Price
Discussions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-02-23/allergan-ceo-pushes-for-trump-to-lead-drug-price-restraint
-talks.
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orphan tax credit and deter excessive uses of the ODA. 93 The second
approach flows from the FDA Guidance, which would impose stricter
pediatric research requirements for orphan drugs and reduce the number
of juvenile treatments that qualify for an orphan designation. 94 Before
evaluating the compatibility and effect of these administrative efforts,
it is important to understand some of their intricacies.
A. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Slashes Orphan Drug Incentives
The Tax Bill is a broad and multi-dimensional piece of legislation
with wide-ranging effects on personal, as well as business economics. 95
Although the Tax Bill does not exclusively target the pharmaceutical
industry, three of its key provision have significant impacts on the
industry by lowering corporate tax rates, 96 providing a special
repatriation rate, 97 and reducing the orphan tax credit. 98 The first two
provisions have the potential to provide enormous benefits to drug
manufacturers. For instance, the corporate tax rate has been slashed
from a variable rate peaking at 35% to a flat rate of 21% for most large
corporations. 99 While this provision has been revered as the “largest
reduction in U.S. corporate tax rates in our nation’s history[,]” 100 some
analysts predict the reduced corporate tax rate, on its own, will have a
93. Sarah Jane Tribble, Advocates for Patients with Rare Diseases Defend Tax
Credits for Orphan Drugs, NPR: HEALTH-SHOTS (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/11/29/567052592/advocates-forpatients-with-rare-diseases-defend-tax-credits-for-orphan-drugs (discussing the Tax
Bill, and asserting that “[w]e need to think about ways we can improve the [ODA]
and stop people from gaming the system and exploiting it”).
94. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 8.
95. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(2017).
96. Id. pt. I, sec. 13001, § 11(b).
97. Id. § 904(E).
98. Id. pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C.
99. Id. pt. I, sec. 13001, § 11(b); see also Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Overview of
Provisions Affecting Business, MAXWELL, LOCKE, & RITTER (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.mlrpc.com/articles/tax-cuts-jobs-act-overview-provisions-affectingbusinesses.
100. Zachary Brennan, Senate, House Agree to Cut Orphan Drug Research
Credit in Half in Tax Bill, RAPS: REGULATORY FOCUS (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2017/12/senate,house-agree-to-cut-orphan-drug-research-credit-in-half-in-tax-bill.
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negative or insubstantial impact on pharmaceutical cash. 101 However,
most agree that coupling it with the repatriation provision provides a
windfall for large pharmaceutical companies and their investors. 102 The
special repatriation rate encourages corporations to bring overseas cash
back to the U.S. Instead of paying the corporate tax rate on profits held
overseas, companies will get a one-time deal that taxes them
approximately 15.5% on funds they bring back to the United States
economy. 103 “Companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Amgen, Gilead,
Pfizer and Merck all keep more than 80% of their cash overseas.” 104
Accordingly, the decreased cost of bringing overseas cash back to the
U.S. is considered a major victory for the bio-pharma industry.105
However, this bonus does not come without sacrifice.
Since 1983, the tax credit for orphan drug manufacturers has been
issued at a rate of 50% of all R&D costs. 106 This was one of the greatest
financial incentives available to bio-pharma manufacturers under the

101. The corporate tax rate is likely to have little impact on the biotechnology
and pharmaceutical industries because the average effective tax rate across all
companies in these sectors is already estimated at approximately 20%. See Aswarth
Damodaran, TAX RATES BY SECTOR (US), NYU: STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Jan.
2018), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ New_Home_Page/datafile/taxrate.htm;
but see Trefis Team, A Look at Big Pharma’s Value Sensitivity to Changes in Tax
Rates, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/great
speculations/2018/01/11/a-look-at-big-pharmas-value-sensitivity-to-changes-in-taxrates/#705523e614d5 (noting “many companies will see a significant impact from
changes in their effective tax rates . . . it will boil down to the expected taxable income
growth and the expected change in their effective tax rate”).
102. Editorial: Drug Firms Lead the Way on Pocketing Tax Cuts, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial
-drug-firms-lead-the-way-on-pocketing-tax-cuts/article_f88c2f67 -8ec6-5875-9230ec7260fadc95.html (“A new survey of U.S. companies from analysts at Morgan
Stanley estimates that 43 percent of the savings from the [Tax Bill] will be paid to
investors in the form of higher dividends and stock buybacks.”); see also
@jimtankersley, TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:59 AM), https://twitter.com/jim
tankersley/status/962370393016291328.
103. Editorial, supra note 102; see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97,
pt. I, sec. 13001, § 904(E), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
104. Brennan, supra note 100; see also @bradloncar, TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2017,
11:45 AM), https://twitter.com/bradloncar/status/935957450481717255.
105. Brennan, supra note 100.
106. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
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ODA. 107 But, after thirty-five years of substantial savings on the R&D
of drugs for rare diseases, the Tax Bill slashed this handsome reward in
half. 108 “The House bill had originally sought to eliminate the tax credit
entirely, meanwhile the Senate bill sought reforms that would reduce
the credit rate to 27.5% of qualified clinical testing expenses.”109
Ultimately, legislators agreed to reduce the credit to 25% of qualified
clinical testing expenses. 110 Proponents of the cut flaunt its $32.5
billion in projected government savings over the next ten years.111
Meanwhile, those opposed to cutting the orphan drug credit argue that
it could both “stifle research on new medications and make the cost of
Thirty-six patient
prescriptions even more expensive.” 112
organizations, including NORD, banded together in opposition of the
weakened orphan tax credit. 113 Surprisingly, biopharma leaders did not
oppose the Tax Bill, likely due to the Bill’s favorable repatriation rate
and corporate tax provisions.

107. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63 (noting “advocates as well as critics of
the industry say tax credits have been an important motivation for companies”).
108. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131
Stat. 2054 (2017).
109. Brennan, supra note 100.
110. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 45C. Stat. 2054 (2017).
111. Brennan, supra note 100.
112. Jessica Waltman, President Trump Signs Tax Cuts and Job Act: Impact on
Health Care and Benefits, KISTLER, TIFFANY BENEFITS (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://ktbenefits.com/2017/12/congress-passes-tax-reform-impact-on-health-careand-benefits.
113. Christina Jensen, Statement by 36 Patient Organizations in Opposition to
Senate’s Proposed Weakening of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit, NORD (Nov. 14,
2017), https://rarediseases.org/statement-36-patient-organizations-opposition-senates
-proposed-weakening-orphan-drug-tax-credit. See also Letter from Nat. Org. for Rare
Disorders, to Division of Dockets Management, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re:
Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380-0005: Guidance: Clarification of Orphan Drug
Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common
Diseases (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.regulations. gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D6380-0016 [hereinafter NORD Letter].
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B. The FDA Guidance Elevates R&D Requirements and Eliminates
Orphan Designations for Some Pediatric Subpopulations
The Tax Bill was introduced almost simultaneously with a draft
Guidance issued by the FDA, which aims to close the PREA
“loophole.” 114 The Guidance explains the FDA’s approach as follows:
FDA intends to no longer continue to grant pediatric-subpopulation
designation. Pediatric-subpopulation designation is no longer
necessary to stimulate the study of drugs in pediatric populations,
now that various programs, such as PREA and BPCA, have proven
to be effective in achieving those ends. Therefore, if a sponsor
requests orphan drug designation for a pediatric subpopulation of a
common disease [in adults], and even if the pediatric subpopulation
prevalence is below 200,000, FDA will not grant orphan drug
designation to that pediatric subpopulation unless:
1. the disease in the pediatric population constitutes a valid
orphan subset, and the drug meets all the other criteria for
orphan designation; or
2. the sponsor can adequately demonstrate that the disease in
the pediatric subpopulation is a different disease from the
disease in the adult population, and the drug meets all other
criteria for orphan designation. For example, if as a
scientific matter, efficacy from clinical studies in the adult
population could not be extrapolated to the pediatric
subpopulation, such information may be considered a
different disease. 115

Ironically, the Guidance is titled “Clarification of Orphan
Designations of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of
Common Diseases[.]” 116 It may seem oxy-moronic to clarify orphan
designations for common diseases when the ODA makes clear that its
incentives apply only to rare diseases. 117 Yet, this is precisely where
the controversy lies: where do you draw the line between rare and
114. See GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4 (explaining the Guidance was created
“in order to close the loophole created by the interaction of the practice of granting
pediatric-subpopulation designation and the PREA orphan exemption”).
115. Id. at 4–5.
116. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
117. See generally Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983);
21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ff (2017).
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common diseases when the prevalence of those aliments varies between
adult and pediatric populations? More importantly, should ODA
incentives be withheld for rare pediatric diseases merely because those
diseases occur commonly in adults? If so, to what extent will
withholding ODA incentives stifle the production of pediatric
treatments? Curiously, the FDA leaves many of these questions
unanswered.
In response, NORD issued a letter calling on the FDA to (1) provide
substantive evidence detailing how the alleged “loophole” in PREA has
been exploited, (2) offer “additional analysis on the possibility for
pediatric drug development and research to actually be weakened by
this move rather than strengthened,” and (3) clarify ambiguities in its
Guidance to ensure “pediatric subpopulations of rare diseases continue
to receive orphan designation since there are few other incentives for
Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Research and
development.” 118
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), as well as BIO, issued letters
asking the FDA to “tailor the scope of the [G]uidance to preserve
incentives for developing drugs for rare pediatric diseases,” and clarify
the terms “pediatric subpopulation(s)” and “pediatric-subpopulation
designation(s).” 119 Like NORD, both PhRMA and BIO also question
the pervasiveness of the industry’s alleged exploitation of the
“loophole” highlighted in the Guidance. 120 At the crux of these

118. NORD Letter, supra note 113, at 2–3.
119. See Letter from PhRMA to Division of Dockets Management, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Re: Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380: Clarification of Orphan
Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common
Diseases; Draft Guidance for Industry (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0017 [hereinafter PhRMA Letter]; see also Letter
from BIO to Dockets Management Branch, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re: Docket
No. FDA-2017-D-6380: Clarification of Orphan Designation of Drugs and Biologics
for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.reg
ulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0012 [hereinafter BIO Letter].
120. See PhRMA Letter, supra note 119 (“PhRMA is concerned with the
implication in the draft guidance that sponsors are acting inappropriately by taking
advantage of a ‘loophole’ to avoid completing studies in pediatric subpopulations.
PhRMA respectfully disagrees with this characterization and, to the extent such a
‘loophole’ exists, believes that it is a legal interpretation of the PREA exemption that
has created this result”); see also BIO Letter, supra note 119 (“[T]he terminology used
by the FDA in the draft guidance implies that sponsors are acting inappropriately by
taking advantage of a ‘loophole.’ BIO respectfully disagrees and requests that the
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concerns is the idea that limiting the groups of pediatric conditions that
qualify for orphan designation reduces incentives to such a degree that
it negatively affects the development and accessibility of treatments for
rare childhood diseases.
IV. THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING: OUTLINING THE EVIDENCE FOR
AND AGAINST PROPOSED EFFECTS ON PRICE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
PEDIATRIC ORPHAN DRUGS
Unique issues arise when the concerns of patient advocacy groups
align with the those of bio-pharma lobbyists. The concerns expressed
by NORD, 121 PhRMA, 122 and BIO 123 about the Guidance correspond
with fears surrounding the new Tax Bill. These groups’ concerns focus
on two common issues. First, how will reduced tax incentives and more
extensive pediatric research requirements impact the price of drugs for
rare childhood disorders? Second, how will these factors impact future
production and development of pediatric orphan drugs?
A. Raising Big Pharma’s Allowance: Will Orphan Drug Prices
Increase?
According to one report, “the largest, most expensive clinical trials
for orphan drugs cost about a quarter as much as those for non-orphan
drugs, after the tax credits are factored in.” 124 Yet, the average annual
cost per patient for orphan drugs in the United States was over
$140,000, compared with $27,756 for non-orphans. 125 Overall, orphan

FDA adjust this language within the guidance to reflect that it has been FDA’s legal
interpretation of the PREA that has allowed for such designations to be granted[.]”).
121. See generally NORD Letter, supra note 113.
122. See generally PhRMA Letter, supra note 119.
123. See generally BIO Letter, supra note 119.
124. Carolyn Y. Johnson, High Prices Make Once-Neglected ‘Orphan’ Drugs
a Booming Business, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/high-prices-make-once-neglected-orpahn-drugs-a-booming-busin
ess/2016/08/04/539d0968-1e10-11e6-9c81-4be1c14fb8c8_story.html?noredirect=on
&utm_term=.25a7a6514679.
125. EVALUATEPHARMA, ORPHAN DRUG REPORT 2017, 9 (4th ed. 2017),
http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/EPOD17.pdf.
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drug sales increased by 12.2% between 2015 and 2016; meanwhile,
non-orphan drug sales increased by a mere 2.4%. 126
Patient populations are much smaller for true orphan indications,
and a smaller market makes it more difficult to recoup even discounted
R&D costs. However, the exorbitant price mark-ups do not necessarily
correspond with the cost of development. 127 It has long been
understood that pharmaceutical companies charge what the market will
bear, 128 rather than some calculated percentage of their clinical
expenditures. This means reducing tax credits, or escalating R&D costs
through mandated pediatric testing, may not have a significant impact
on pediatric orphan drug pricing.
1. Examining the Industry’s Lack of Transparency
Assessing the true R&D costs and fair price for a new drug is
extremely difficult because the pharmaceutical industry operates free
from transparency requirements. 129 This leads to increased scrutiny of
the bio-pharma industry. 130 As a result, “companies such as Eli Lilly
and Johnson & Johnson have given peaks [sic] behind the curtain of
drug pricing decisions.” 131 Meanwhile, other companies – including
Allergan, AbbVie, and Novo Nordisk – have implemented “social
contracts” with patients, pledging to limit the number of annual price
increases and to keep price hikes in the single-digit percentages. 132
126. Id. at 8.
127. See id. at 11 (noting that, instead, prices correlate with patient population
size).
128. Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and
Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 244 n.184 (1999)
(citing Frederick T. Schut & Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Price
Discrimination: The Pharmaceutical Industry, 44 WORLD DEV. 1141, 1142 (1986))
(“the pharmaceutical industry charges what the market will bear”).
129. Gilbert Carrillo, Drug Transparency Laws Will Not Drive Pharmaceutical
Prices Down and Will Only Stifle Innovation, 25 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE 77, 80 (2015).
130. See Bell, supra note 61 (“[P]ushback from consumers, PBMs, payers and
lawmakers has become much stronger as of late[.]”).
131. Id.
132. Id.; see, e.g., Brent Saunders, Our Social Contract with Patients, CEO
BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-
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In September 2016, Allergan became the first company to
voluntarily promise to limit its annual drug price increases to singledigit percentages. Although the use of social contracts as self-imposed
price regulations is a new and unpopular practice among the majority
of pharmaceutical leaders, the significant long-term impacts are already
apparent. 133 However, effectuating a voluntary program that slashes
financial returns in half requires a delicate balance between the
regulatory restraints that seek to protect patient interests and the
autonomous business interests of drug makers. 134 Unfortunately,
neither the Tax Bill, nor the Guidance come anywhere close to
addressing the issue of transparency or pharmaceutical pricing
restraints. Meanwhile, some drug manufacturers have stopped
pretending that R&D costs justify their price markers. For example,
In a slide deck released to a Senate committee last year, Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International outlined its reasoning for a price hike
for Syprine, a three-decade-old-rare-disease drug that ultimately
went from $652 for 100 capsules to $21,267 over a five-year period.
The slide explains the reason for the price hike: “Progressive pricing
actions to bring in line with comparable Orphan products.” 135

Likewise, Martin Shkreli 136 attempted to justify his company’s
exponentially high price-increase for Daraprim, an old drug used to
social-contract-with-patients (“Where we increase price on our branded therapeutic
medicines, we will take price increases no more than once per year and, when we do,
they will be limited to single digit percentage increases.”).
133. For example, Allergan “raised 2017 list prices by an average of only 6.7
percent” when the overall “average price increase for branded drugs was 12.92 percent
in 2016.” Joanna Shepherd, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Social Contract With
Patients, MORNING CONSULT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/opinions
/pharmaceutical-industrys-social-contract-patients/. The effect of annual price
increases accumulates over time, “with a 12.92-percent annual price increase resulting
in drug prices that are twice what a 6.7-percent annual price increase would produce
in 15 years.” Id.
134. Id.
135. Johnson, supra note 124.
136. Martin Shkreli, criticized as “the most hated man in America,” is a former
pharmaceutical executive who became notorious for raising the price of Daraprim
from $13.50 per pill to $750 per pill. Zoe Thomas & Tim Swift, Who is Martin Shkreli
– “The Most Hated Man in America”?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-34331761.
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fight a rare infection, by explaining “[t]his drug is priced similarly to
other drugs for rare disease, and I think physicians understand that.”137
The truth is, “[n]owhere are the strange economics of drug pricing more
difficult to understand than when a drug invented decades earlier is
granted orphan status – and an orphan price.” 138
When consumers are already being price-gouged for age-old drugs
that required little to no R&D expenditures, how are we to arrive at the
conclusion that decreased orphan tax incentives will do anything other
than render even higher pricing? The practice is already in place, and
pharmaceutical sponsors admit their pricing does not necessarily
parallel their R&D costs. 139 Indeed, even a cursory review of clinical
expenditures and profits for orphan drugs reinforces the notion that
development costs do not correlate to increased drug prices.
2. A Brief Comparison of Orphan Drug Development Costs Versus
Pricing
Although a lack of transparency in the pharmaceutical industry
impedes access to abundant data sources, a holistic review of cost
versus profit is still possible. A research study published by the Journal
of the American Medical Association (“ JAMA”) in September 2017
provided an estimate of R&D spending, as well as profits, for ten cancer
drugs of which nine hold orphan designations. 140 The researchers
explain, “[a] common justification for high cancer drug prices is the
sizeable [R&D] outlay necessary to bring a drug to the U.S. market.” 141
However, the study found that the approximate “cost to develop a
cancer drug is $648.0 million, a figure significantly lower than prior
estimates.” 142 Meanwhile, “the revenue since approval is substantial,”
averaging $1,658.4 million, and ranging from $204.1 million to
$22,275.0 million.143
137. Johnson, supra note 124.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending
to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA
INT’L MED. 1569 (2017).
141. Id. at 1569.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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A separate study, issued by EvaluatePharma in 2016, noted a
correlation between the available patient population and the revenue per
patient for the top 20 selling orphan drugs. 144 The study also found that
as the patient population got smaller (i.e. fewer than 10,000), the
correlation became closer. 145 This confirms “industry perceptions that
smaller patient groups allow a pricing premium to be achieved versus
non-orphans.” 146 This reinforces the idea that orphan drug pricing is
not tethered to R&D costs. Instead, the market is based on “innovation
premiums for drugs that create a step change in treatment options and
therapy outcomes.” 147
“The high prices of orphan drugs have been detached from the
[ODA’s] original rationale – that incentives are necessary for
companies to recoup the costs of [R&D] of treatments with tiny
markets.” 148 The pricing schema has also been removed from consumer
idealism, i.e., the idea that the profit margin should correspond with
production costs. Today, the “[orphan] market has come to expect high
prices for any drug that treats very few patients.” 149 What is worse is
“the system lacks any real mechanism to counter the price increases.”150
“Drug companies argue that any change to incentives could lead the
industry to abandon orphans once more.” 151 Patients and advocates
have the same concern. However, these reports also demonstrate that
“orphan drugs give companies virtually unlimited pricing power,”152
irrespective of the Tax Bill’s diminished incentives or the Guidance’s
added R&D requirements.

144. EVALUATEPHARMA, supra note 125, at 11.
145. Id.
146. Id. (asserting “Soliris confirms the pricing power resulting from
indications with the fewest number of patients”).
147. Id. (using the Gleevec product as an example).
148. Johnson, supra note 124.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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B. A Time-Out for Drug Development: Will the Tax Bill and
Guidance Lead to Reduced Engagement in the Pediatric Orphan Drug
Market?
While pricing concerns appear unsubstantiated, suspicion that the
Tax Bill and Guidance will impede innovation and deter participation
in the already vulnerable pediatric orphan drug market is merited. In
its letter to the FDA, NORD expressed concerns that there may be rare
pediatric subpopulations that would have received R&D under the
previous incentive structure that will now be ignored. 153 The
organization explains, “[b]oth PREA and BPCA exist to encourage
these studies, but PREA requirements can be avoided using the
sometimes unpredictable waiver and deferral process, and the six
months of exclusivity offered by BPCA has not shown to be an
adequate incentive in every case.” 154 Essentially, NORD argues that
despite the Guidance’s aim to encourage pediatric testing, drug makers
can easily get around PREA research requirements through waivers.
In fact, by eliminating a company’s eligibility to receive ODA
benefits for some pediatric subpopulations, the Guidance actually
encourages business-minded drug makers to seek a PREA waiver.
Now, instead of receiving the abundant financial incentives and seven
years of added exclusivity under the ODA, the drug maker is left with
a mere six months of additional exclusivity under BPCA. If the sixmonth incentive alone is not enough to satisfy its return on investment,
the drug maker will be effectively deterred from pursuing R&D in the
pediatric subpopulation. This problem is intensified for small-scale and
startup pharmaceutical companies that rely heavily on the incentives
accrued by orphan designations. 155 Aevi Genomic Medicine, in its
responsive letter to the FDA Guidance, argues “[w]ithout these
incentives, developing drugs for children can be prohibitively
expensive and practically impossible for small companies.” 156

153.
154.
155.
156.

NORD Letter, supra note 113, at 2.
Id.
Aevi Letter, supra note 9, at 1.
Id.
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1. Using PREA’s Waiver System to Avoid Pediatric Testing in
Orphan Subpopulations
PREA’s waiver system provides a means for drug maker avoid its
obligation to conduct pediatric testing even where the Guidance would
otherwise impose such a requirement. A full waiver of PREA’s
requirement to submit pediatric assessments is granted if “[n]ecessary
studies are impossible or highly impracticable (because, for example,
the number of patients is so small or the patients are geographically
dispersed)[.]” 157 One important challenge that has persisted with
pharmaceutical testing in children under BPCA and PREA is the
“relatively small population of potential test subjects.” 158 “With
children accounting for only 24.6% of the United States population, it
is hard to find enough children to participate in studies.” 159 In addition,
“the size of this country makes it nearly impossible to confine the study
to a particular geographic area as children with a specific condition are
likely to spread across the country.” 160 With only a small number of
participants, “studies may not be able to generate statistically reliable
information concerning the effectiveness of a drug relative to a control
group or a placebo.” 161 The problem is exacerbated when the
subpopulation is narrowed due to the rarity of a disease in children, even
if that same disease is widespread in adults. This is one reason it makes
sense to exempt orphan drugs from the more stringent pediatric research
requirements imposed by PREA. 162 Theoretically, it also may be why
drug makers are able to easily secure a waiver or deferral from PREA’s
clinical study requirements as NORD suggests. 163
A comparative study conducted by members of the FDA and the
European Medicines Agency (“EMA”) examined some of the waivers

157. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HOW TO COMPLY
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY ACT; DRAFT GUIDANCE (2005) (citing The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C § 505B(a)(4)(A)(i) (1938)).
158. See Jerles, supra note 42, at 523.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., ETHICAL CONDUCT OF
CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 27, 81 (2004)).
162. See generally NORD Letter, supra note 113.
163. Id. at 2.
WITH THE
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granted under PREA between 2007 and 2013. 164 Several waivers were
granted because the potential pediatric study population was too
small. 165 For example, the FDA granted a full PREA waiver to Bracco
Diagnostics for CardioGen-82 (rubidium-82), a drug used to treat
coronary artery disease. 166 “For the proposed adult indication, [the
FDA] considered that the number of pediatric patients with coronary
artery disease was too small and granted the waiver based on rarity of
the disease, rendering pediatric studies impossible or highly
impractical.” 167 Similarly, when considering a PREA waiver for
zoledronic acid, the FDA “waived the requirement to conduct pediatric
studies in osteoporosis because of the rarity of the disease in the
pediatric population.” 168
The FDA-EMA study also compared the number of waivers
granted in the United States to those granted in Europe. 169 The data
collected provides some insight into the ease with which drug makers
can evade PREA’s pediatric testing requirements. 170 Of the products
reviewed for waivers by both the EMA and the FDA, the agencies
adopted similar opinions about whether or not the waiver should be
granted 86% of the time. 171 The agencies boasted the value of these
parallel outcomes, noting that “[t]his harmonization of scientific
opinion is encouraging.” 172 They explain, “while medical research in
children is of the utmost importance to facilitate the development of
safe and effective medicines for the pediatric population, regulatory
agencies need to grant [waivers] from pediatric medical research

164. See generally Gunter F. Egger, et al., A Comparative Review of Waivers
Granted in Pediatric Drug Development by FDA and EMA from 2007-2013, 50
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 639, 639–47 (2016).
165. Id. at 643.
166. Id.; see Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Bracco Diagnostics Inc.,
NDA 19-414/S-012 (July 29, 2010), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_
docs/appletter/2010/019414s012ltr.pdf.
167. Egger, supra note 164, at 643; NORD Letter, supra note 113.
168. Egger, supra note 164.
169. Id. at 640.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 646.
172. Id.
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obligations in selected cases . . . to prevent unnecessary clinical
research in children, a vulnerable population.” 173
Notably, the EMA granted 88% of such waivers requested for
single active substance products. 174 However, “of the 405 full waiver
requests submitted” to the EMA, only 80 (20%) were also reviewed by
the FDA during the study period. 175 This variance is largely attributed
to the different regulatory structures in the U.S. versus the E.U.176
Namely, the PREA “loophole” exempts orphan products “from
pediatric research requirements in the U.S., whereas they are not
exempt from obligations of the Paediatric Regulation in the E.U.”177
However, the FDA’s new Guidance now brings these varied regulatory
structures into closer alignment.
Like the European system, the Guidance eliminates pediatric
testing exemptions previously available to certain orphan products
under PREA, 178 leaving drug makers with only one option – waivers.
Accordingly, the U.S. is likely to see an increase in PREA waiver
requests which would mirror the quantity reported in the E.U., and with
an 86% similarity index between EMA and FDA decisions, it is fair to
predict that the FDA will also mimic the EMA’s outcomes when it
comes to granting waivers. Hence, if the FDA matches the EMA’s 88%
approval rate of pediatric testing waivers, a substantial number of drugs
will now be excused from pediatric testing. Further, under the new
Guidance, these drugs will no longer receive any of the ODA benefits
used to entice manufacturers to engage in such testing despite an
exemption.
2. The Prohibitive Effect on Small Bio-Pharma Companies
Aevi, a small genomic development company, contends that
“without orphan designation[s], the development of novel drugs and
biologics in children is much more difficult and in many cases,
practically impossible” because “[c]linical trials in pediatric

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 646
Id. at 642.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id.
See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 8.
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populations, especially orphan populations are often difficult and
arduous.” 179 Aevi explains that most of the companies engaged in the
production of pediatric orphan drugs are small-scale organizations that
“can benefit greatly from the incentives provided by orphan drug
designation.” 180 Specifically, Aevi explains that the seven years of
regulatory exclusivity the ODA offers has been crucial to the
development of older drugs that have a limited patent life for new
pediatric indications. 181
Small-to-medium-sized companies require exclusivity to provide
stockholders with a guarantee that competitors cannot infringe upon its
products.” 182 Although “diseases affecting 200,000 Americans are
‘rare’ under the law, they may represent sizeable – even hugely
profitable – markets for small companies.” 183 In addition, orphan
designations under the ODA are based solely on U.S. disease
populations. 184 Because the ODA “does not account for the potential
profits on international sales,” its incentives become even more enticing
for companies both small and large. 185 The proof of profitability for
orphan drug manufacturers benefiting from the ODA’s financial

179. Aevi Letter, supra note 9, at 1.
180. Id.; see also Suzanne Shelley, Orphan Drug Commercialization is
Maturing, PHARMACEUTICAL COMMERCE (Sept. 1, 2016), http://pharmaceutical
commerce.com/brand-marketing-communications/orphan-drug-commercializationmaturing (noting “many of the companies pursuing orphan drugs have been smaller
companies”). But see Joseph Burns, Orphan Drugs: Way Too Many, Way Too
Expensive, MANAGED CARE: DRUG MANAGEMENT (June 4, 2017), https://www.mana
gedcaremag.com/archives/2017/6/orphan-drugs-way-too-many-way-too-expensive
(“When the orphan drug legislation was passed, small pharmaceutical companies and
universities were developing medications for rare diseases . . . . Right now, all the
largest pharmaceutical companies are involved in the research and development of
orphan drugs.”).
181. See Aevi Letter, supra note 9. See also Annette K. Kwok, et al., Incentives
to Repurpose Existing Drugs for Orphan Indications, 6 ACS MED. CHEMISTRY
LETTERS 828, 828 (2015) (explaining the value of incentives for repurposing existing
drugs for orphan indications).
182. Bohrer, supra note 74, at 381 n.74 (citing John Henkel, ORPHAN DRUG
PRODUCTS: NEW HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISORDERS, FDA SPECIAL REPORT ON
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1995)).
183. Id. at 381.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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incentives has been crucial in establishing the industry.” 186 He
explains, “[the ODA] suddenly created a business model that said you
can go after these incredibly rare diseases and survive.” 187
The Guidance threatens to minimize access to ODA incentives for
pediatric subpopulations, which have been fundamental to the
sustainability of small businesses. It is also important to note that some
of the Tax Bill’s favorable corporate benefits do not flow to small-scale
companies. For example, pharmaceutical giants that keep substantial
revenues overseas can reap the benefits of the Bill’s low repatriation
rate. 188 Additionally, to the extent that a profitable company’s effective
tax rate is lowered by the new corporate tax, their financial yields could
increase. 189 This is not so for small companies that have not yet become
profitable and do not hold cash overseas. 190 Hence, while large-scale
corporations are able to hedge their loss in orphan tax credits against
their gains from other provisions, small-scale companies only feel the
burden of losing an important incentive. It is unclear whether this loss
will be enough to push small players out of the orphan drug market
completely, but it is certainly enough to generate concern.
Ultimately, big pharma has been awarded a lower corporate tax rate
and reduced costs for bringing cash back into the U.S. This translates
to more cash in corporate pockets with no incentive to direct those
yields where they are most needed – the orphan drug market. 191 In fact,
there is a direct disincentive for manufacturers to engage in these
markets of great need due to the reduced orphan tax credit and more
rigid pediatric testing requirements. Meanwhile, big pharma continues
to operate without transparency, and free from requirements to keep
186. Johnson, supra note 124.
187. Id.
188. See Brennan, supra note 100; see also @bradloncar, supra note 104.
189. John Engle, How Tax Reform Will Impact Development Biotech, SEEKING
ALPHA (Dec. 18, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4132460-taxreform-will-impact-developmental-biotech (“Dropping the corporate tax rate . . . will
be a boon for all case flow positive businesses, but it may have some negative impacts
on development-stage businesses that are currently burning capital in order to develop
new products. Such is the case in much of biotech, in which a large number of
development-stage companies make significant annual losses.”).
190. Id.
191. Jennifer Huron, 35 Ways to Celebrate the 35th Anniversary of NORD,
NORD (Mar. 5, 2018), https://rarediseases.org/35-ways-celebrate-35th-anniversarynord (noting that 95% of the 7,000 rare diseases still have no treatment).
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profits within a reasonable range or to pass savings on to consumers.
Hence, exorbitant orphan drug pricing remains unchanged and
pharmaceutical giants prevail with greater profitability. Meanwhile,
children with rare diseases suffer as the overall value of developing
treatments for their conditions has been diminished.
CONCLUSION
Since its 1983 enactment, the ODA has been monumental in
spurring the development and accessibility of treatments for rare
disorders. The same is true for the impact that BPCA and PREA have
had on the research and development of drugs for pediatric indications.
However, industry exploitation of ODA benefits, as well as strategic
uses of the PREA-ODA “loophole,” run contrary to the legislative
intent behind these provisions. Big pharma is reigning in huge profits
by gaming the systems intended to benefit vulnerable patient
populations. In an effort to curb these industry abuses, the
administration has used the Tax Bill to reduce the orphan tax credit, and
the FDA issued the Guidance to eliminate drug sponsors’ eligibility to
receive ODA benefits for some pediatric subpopulations.
However, these joint efforts fail to address pervasive concerns
related to the ODA. For example, although the Guidance prevents
pediatric orphan designations for diseases commonly manifested in
adults, it does not address “salami slicing” practices. In other words,
drug manufacturers can continue to harvest ODA incentives by
introducing a drug under its rare indication then catapulting it to a
blockbuster through off-label and subsequently approved indications.
This allows for continued abuse of the ODA on a large scale, while
deterring engagement in pediatric subpopulations – where research is
arguably most needed.
In addition, the Tax Bill’s reduced orphan tax credit does not
address the problems attributed to a lack of price transparency and
price-gouging in the orphan market. In fact, the bill’s favorable
corporate tax rate and repatriation provision allow greater profitability
for large companies in the mass market. Meanwhile, it removes
incentives from small-players who rely heavily on the rare disease
sector. Although the Tax Bill and PREA Guidance were introduced, at
least in part, to curb abuses of the ODA and the PREA “loophole,” there
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is no indication that these efforts actually advance the interests of
pediatric orphan drug consumers (i.e. children with rare disease).
Unfortunately, the combined effect of these administrative efforts
exemplifies the type of lopsided government action that inadvertently
advances the interests of drug makers while failing to consider the
disparate impacts on patients. The joint measures threaten to, yet again,
tip the scales in favor of drug makers. Reducing tax credits and forcing
drug makers to engage in more extensive pediatric research for rare
diseases might reduce big pharma’s profits, however, it will not reduce
patients’ costs or make more treatments available to them. Ultimately,
the Tax Bill, coupled with the FDA Guidance, reduces engagement in
the pediatric orphan drug market while permitting bio-pharma firms to
price-gouge orphan drug consumers and operate free of transparency or
profit limitations. In the end, the only groups that stand to lose are
children suffering from rare diseases.
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